One of the discretionary accounts managed by Farnsworth is the Jones Corporation employee profit- sharing plan. Jones, the company president, recently asked
Farnsworth to vote the shares in the profit- sharing plan in favor of the company-nominated slate of directors and against the directors sponsored by a dissident stockholder group. Farnsworth does not want to lose this account because he directs all the account's trades to a brokerage firm that provides Farnsworth with useful information about tax-free investments. Although this information is not of value in managing the Jones Corporation account, it does help managing several other accounts. The brokerage firm providing this information also offers the lowest commissions for trades and best execution. Farnsworth investigates the directors' issue, concludes that management's slate is better for the long-run performance of the firm than the dissident group's slate and votes accordingly.
Farnsworth:
Click on the arrows to vote for the correct answer
A. B. C. D.A
This question pertains to Standard IV (B.1) Fiduciary Duties, in particular members' responsibilities for voting proxies and the use of client brokerage. Because
Farnsworth investigated the issue and concluded independently the best way to vote, he was not in violation of his fiduciary duties even though the company president asked him to vote the shares of the profit-sharing plan a certain way. Moreover because the brokerage firm provides the lowest commissions and best executions, he has met his fiduciary duties to the client in using this brokerage firm. Since he's not paying any extra money of the client for the information he's receiving from the brokerage firm, it does not matter.